The American Divide – Causes or Effects?

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A fascinating read providing some insight into causes, or possible effects, of division in the United States. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577170733817181646.html?mod=WSJ_WSJ_US_News_10_1

I’m not sure whether this article identifies causes or effects, but it seems clear that people who profess a religion, delay children until after marriage, stay married, and finish high school, if not college fare better economically than people who profess no faith or religion, have children outside of marriage, get divorced, and do not, at least, finish high school.  The article does not examine whether the more “traditional” lifestyle leads to more economic success or whether people who are more economically successful gravitate toward a more “traditional” lifestyle.  The presented facts are food for thought.

The demographic differences seem to suggest that, as the middle class experienced division since 1960, during a time of broad cultural change in the United States and elsewhere, two seemingly distinct cultures emerged.  These distinctions may help account for the increasing sense of division in U.S. society and among our elected officials, along with the increasing sense of polarization in general.  Whether these are causes or effects, what is the vision of leaders for addressing the causes and the effects?

Are the United States and Western Europe subject to an “Arab Spring”?

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In the August 22, 2011 issue of Time, Thornburgh, Adams, Assinder, Cooke, Mayer, and Grose (2011) noted some similarities between the economic situation in the United Kingdom, Egypt, Tunisia, and the United States. While Thornburgh et al. focused on the violence and unrest in the United Kingdom, he observed that the United States has more income distribution inequality than the United Kingdom although more people in the United States seem more optimistic about their economic prospects than their U. K. counterparts.

 

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reported that income distribution inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was 0.26 in Sweden; 0.30 in Germany and Australia; 0.32 in Greece, in Canada, in Japan, and in Spain; 0.34 in the U.K.; 0.35 in Italy; and 0.36 in Portugal. By comparison, the Gini was 0.38 for the United States and Yemen, 0.43 in Turkey; 0.47 in Mexico; 0.34 for Egypt,  0.40 for Tunisia, 0.42 for Syria and for Iraq, and 0.4 for Jordan.

 

Another apparent measure of potential unrest seems to be unemployment in various demographic groups. Table 1 shows the unemployment rate  for 16-24 year-olds and overall and measures of national debt, % GDP of exports, and % college graduates.

Table 1

Unemployment, national debt, export, import, and college graduation levels by country.

Country Unemployment15-24 UnemploymentTotal National Debt % GDP Export % GDP Import % GDP % College Graduates
Australia 11.5    5.2   11.0 22.5 23.1 33.7
Canada 14.8   8.0   36.1 35.0 31.4 47.0
Egypt 25.0 11.9   73.8   5.0 10.4
Germany  9.7   7.1   44.4 50.4 41.4 23.9
Greece 38.5 12.5 147.8   7.9 27.5 22.2
Iraq 22.0 15.3 42.4 36.3
Italy 27.9   8.4 109.0 28.8 29.6 12.9
Japan   9.2  5.0 183.5 17.9 17.5 40.5
Jordan 32.0 12.5  63.2 21.2 37.6
Mexico   9.5  5.3  27.5 18.9 20.0 15.4
Portugal 27.2 10.8  88.0 10.6   6.8 13.5
Spain 46.2 20.1  51.7 19.5 29.1 28.5
Sweden 25.2   8.4  33.8 54.0 49.1 30.5
Syria 26.0   8.3  28.6 11.0 14.4
Tunisia 24.0 13.0  50.4 16.7 20.3
Turkey 21.7 11.9  42.9 13.3 20.4 10.4
United Kingdom 19.1   7.8  85.5 21.0 29.1 30.5
United States 18.4   9.1  61.3 9.0 15.1 39.5
Yemen 49* 35.0  36.1 11.9 13.2
* estimated

 

Income inequality may not be a predictor of anarchy, unrest, or revolt. Egypt, Greece, and the United Kingdom each experienced unrest in 2011 and had lower Gini coefficients than the United States, while Tunisia, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq each have more income inequality and have experienced unrest in 2011. Then we have Germany, Australia, Canada, and Mexico with less or more income inequality and no apparent unrest, at least unrest related to economic disparity.

 

The official unemployment rate for all working age people and young people in the United States is lower than in most economically-developed countries and, for most Western countries, is lower than in most economically-developing countries, including countries experiencing unrest and anarchy in 2011. The exception seems to be the United Kingdom. Unemployment rates seem to predict unrest, like the 2011 Arab Spring, but most of the Western world does not seem to be nearing an Arab Spring on the basis of lack of employment.

 

Likewise, national debt as a percentage of GDP, national budget deficit as a percentage of total budget, and exports and imports as a percentage of GDP do not seem to predict national unrest and anarchy.

 

Table 2 shows human rights (for 2010 compiled by FreedomHouse.org), and corruption, democracy, and press freedom (compiled by WorldAudit.org) for these same countries. Table 2 also includes  World Economic Forum rankings of  national competitiveness cited by Schumann and Hauslohner (2011).

Table 2

2010-2011 Relative human rights, corruption, democracy, press freedom, and national competitiveness rankings by country.

Country Human Rights Corruption Democracy Press Freedom National Competitiveness
Australia 1 8 9 22 20
Austria 1 12 13 19 19
Belgium 1 17 12 5 15
Canada 1 6 8 16 12
Denmark 1 1 1 4 8
Egypt 6 79 91 91 94
France 1 20 17 23 18
Germany 1 12 11 12 6
Greece 1 61 35 37 90
Iraq 5 146 123 105 NR
Italy 1 52 35 42 43
Japan 1 14 29 19 9
Jordan 6 36 77 101 71
Mexico 2 79 65 91 58
Netherlands 1 7 6 7 7
Portugal 1 26 18 10 45
Spain 1 24 22 27 36
Sweden 1 4 1 1 3
Switzerland 1 8 6 6 1
Syria 7 101 134 134 98
Tunisia 7 45 113 141 40
Turkey 3 42 59 70 59
United Kingdom 1 15 14 16 10
United States 1 17 15 14 5
Yemen 6 119 134 129 138

The data in Table 2 seems to be a better indicator of anarchy, unrest, or revolt. Three tiers of countries seem to emerge. Most at risk, based on the 2010-2011 data in Table 2, are Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Each of these countries has experienced some level of unrest in 2011. At moderate risk, based on this same data, are Greece, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and Turkey with France and Portugal nearby. Likely not at risk for anarchy, unrest, or revolt in the near future are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

 

So, are the United States and Western Europe at risk for an “Arab Spring”-like event in the near future? The data does not seem to support a prediction of unrest in most of Western Europe, the United States (or the other countries of North America, Mexico and Canada), or in Australia or Japan. The data seems to point to legitimate concern about the potential for unrest in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey with France and Portugal worthy of attention. This analysis should not be interpreted as suggesting that people in countries with an indication of low or moderate risk will not demand change related to the national economy, employment opportunities, and effective leadership, but only may indicate comparative risk.

 

Schumann, M. & Hauslohner, A. (2011, August 22). Seeking growth after the  Arab Spring. Unless it can nurture entrepreneurs and create jobs, the popular  movement that toppled dictates won’t make a difference in real lives. Time, 178(7), B1-B6.

Thornburgh, N., Adams, W., Assinder, N., Cooke, S., Mayer, C., & Grose, T.  (2011, August 22). London’s long burn. An  outbreak of arson, looting and lawlessness caught Britain and it’s leaders by  surprise. Why they should have seen the troubles coming. Time, 178(7), 28-31.